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We present a modification of the most commonly used integrated assessment model (IAM) of climate 
change (DICE-2016), AD-DICE2016, which is designed to address three key aspects of climate-
economy models: treat-ment of uncertainty, the use of more appropriate utility functions, and 
including adaptation policies to climate change. These modifications ensure that two of the key 
difficulties identified with IAMs, the choice of the risk aversion parameter and the underestimation 
of damages, are also directly addressed. The use of a bounded (Burr) utility function ensures 
that the model is able to appropriately assess the effects of parameters whose distributions 
have “fat tails”. Uncertainty is accommodated via the state-contingent approach enabling us to 
include more state (seven) and control variables (four) than recursive derivatives of DICE. Our 
approach to uncertainty ensures that the optimal climate policies account for outcomes in 
every possible state, unlike the Monte Carlo approach. Our treatment of uncertainty is 
extensive: eight parameters are allowed to be random, with distributions –many “fat tailed”–
identified using current knowledge. Our model suggests that uncertainty regarding damages and 
climate sensitivity are key drivers of climate policy. We also find that uncertainty leads to 
increases in both optimal mitigation and adaptation, with adaptation and mitigation reacting 
differently to uncertainty over different parameters. Finally, our estimates of the social cost of 
carbon are larger when uncer-tainty is allowed for and significantly affected by adaptation.
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1 Introduction
Climate change remains the pre-eminent global environmental policy challenge. To enable climate policy
setting by appropriately balancing the needs of economic growth with minimising climate-related dam-
ages to society, a framework integrating the essence of economics and climate science is essential. Inte-
grated Assessment Models (IAMs), which were developed to model the causal chain of climate change
as completely as possible, provide this framework and have been extensively employed by governments
and international organisations for evaluating climate change policies.
The relevance of IAMs for climate policy making has been questioned recently (see e.g. Pindyck
[2013,0], Heal [2017]), due largely to the following four lacunae: First, the modeling of damages, and
in particular, the damage function, are widely acknowledge as being lacking (see e.g. Pindyck [2013],
Hanemann [2009], Stern [2013], Dietz and Asheim [2012]) in key dimensions, including estimation tech-
niques (which often rely on outdated and even extrapolated data, and only include a limited number a
climate impacts, see e.g. Tol [2008], Burke et al. [2015], Tol [2018]). Furthermore, impacts have been
aggregated (across sectors of the economy and regions of the world) due both to lack of data and for
model simplicity and computational tractability. Moreover, impacts in IAMs are generally modelled as
GDP impacts (so called “level effects”), whereas modelling impacts in terms of GDP growth rate, damage
to stocks (capital, labour), and effects on TFP or utility would arguably be a more accurate reflection of
reality (Fankhauser [2005], Wing and Lanzi [2014]). Second, the option of adaptation is often either not
included at all or only simplistically accommodated, ignoring regional differences in adaptation ability
(de Bruin and Dellink [2011], Tol [2008]). Third, IAMs often use unbounded utility functions, and the
most commonly used functional form, the Constant Relative Risk Aversion (or CRRA) turns out to be
unsuited for the task at hand (see e.g. Weitzman [2009], Ikefuji et al. [2011], Pindyck [2013], Ikefuji
et al. [2020]). Fourth, and finally, uncertainty pervades every component of the complex chain of cause-
and-effect linking economic output to climate impacts. The effects of uncertainty are difficult to both
understand from first principles (Lemoine [2021]) and to appropriately account in the IAMs (Morgan
and Dowlatabadi [1996], Peterson [2006], van Asselt and Rotmans [2002], Weitzman [2009], Pindyck
[2013], Stern [2013], Ikefuji et al. [2020]).
Given the relevance of integrated frameworks such as the IAMs for climate policy making, many
alternative approaches to addressing the issues highlighted above have been explored in the literature1: a
few studies have explored the beneficial effects of more appropriate utility functions (Ikefuji et al. [2013],
Millner [2013], Ikefuji et al. [2020]); many studies explore different ways of accommodating uncertainty,
be it parametric (using the rather common “Monte Carlo” approach), recursive (Traeger [2014], Crost
and Traeger [2013], Cai et al. [2015], Ikefuji et al. [2020]) or a mix of both (Pizer [1999]); a few studies
explore whether, and to what extent, the combination of uncertainty (including the effect of so-called “fat
1 The literature involving advances on many of these fronts are too large to easily review. Nonetheless, we mention a few
specific studies here; Glanemann et al. [2020] implement damages based on recent econometric estimates by Burke et al.
[2015] and Piontek et al. [2019] implement climate impacts through different channels. de Bruin et al. [2009a], Bahn et al.
[2019], Bosello et al. [2010] include adaptation as a policy option.
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tailed” distributions of key parameters) and welfare functions and frameworks affect climate mitigation
policy (Ackerman et al. [2010], Dietz and Asheim [2012], Ikefuji et al. [2020]). However, very few
studies integrate many of these questions, and fewer still consider the question of adaptation to climate
change in these frameworks.
The main purpose of this paper is to develop an extension of the most widely used IAM, DICE-
2016R2 (detailed in Nordhaus [2018] and often simply called “DICE 2016”), with a view to addressing
some of the key challenges detailed above. To this end, the model we develop, AD-DICE2016, extends
DICE-2016R2 in the following ways: (i) explicitly allowing for adaptation to climate change, a key
component of any climate policy package, in addition to mitigation; (ii) accommodating uncertainty over
a large number of parameters (eight), with distributions for each chosen based upon best available data
and estimates, and “fat-tailed” distributions allowed in key parameters; (iii) illustrating the use of a more
appropriate bounded utility function, which not only allows for more sensible consumption evaluation
but also for more appropriate risk profiles at low consumption values. Using the model so-developed, we
shed light on three key aspects of climate policy: (1) What effect does uncertainty in parameters exert
on optimal climate policies? (2) How do adaptation and mitigation relate to each other, and how does
uncertainty affect them both? and (3) How is the Social Cost of Carbon (SCC) affected by uncertainty?
While many of the questions we address have been studied–in isolation– in the past, our contribution here
lies in analyzing these questions in a richer and unified framework.
DICE-2016 and many recent models derived recently from it (e.g. Traeger [2014], Crost and Traeger
[2013]) have two control variables, mitigation and capital investments. AD-DICE2016, which is built on
the deterministic version developed in de Bruin et al. [2009a], de Bruin [2011], allows for explicit adapta-
tion to climate change,2 leading to an increase in the number of policy (control) variables to four, namely
capital investments, mitigation, reactive (flow) adaptation and proactive (stock) adaptation. Proactive
adaptation involves long term investments, which occur in anticipation of climate change, whereas re-
active adaptation, evidently, occurs in reaction to realized climate change. Thus, in contrast to current
approaches to modifying DICE to accommodate uncertainty that rely on simplifying certain dimensions
of DICE (Traeger [2014], Crost and Traeger [2013], Cai et al. [2015]), typically by reducing state space,
our approach is to enrich the basic DICE, leading both to enlarged state space (from six to seven states)
and an increase in the number of controls (two to four). In consequence, our model is also able to high-
light the relative roles of adaptation and mitigation under uncertainty, itself an interesting topic of research
and of much policy relevance. Apart from one study using a framework with one uncertain parameter
(Felgenhauer and de Bruin [2009]), adaptation and its interaction with mitigation under uncertainty has
been virtually unexplored.3
2 Adaptation to climate change refers to social and economic changes which limit the amount of damage associated with a
certain level of climate change (Smit et al. [2001]).
3 Prior analytical work (e.g. Ingham et al. [2007]) finds that uncertainty leads to increased adaptation and reduced mitigation,
which is an issue our model can shed light on.
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Uncertainty in IAMs, which arises from a variety of sources, is challenging to effectively accommo-
date, leading to a lack of clarity regarding its implications for policy. Integrating uncertainty into IAMs
represents a major challenge and has generated a large number of studies with many perspectives and
approaches. The two main approaches in the literature differ in terms of whether uncertainty is resolved
“all at once” or whether it evolves and persists over time. The first approach, termed “ex-ante” in Crost
and Traeger [2013], is often associated with the “Monte Carlo” approach. In this approach (which is
widely used in applied studies), uncertainty is not intrinsically a part of the decision making process,
allowing one to “draw” the presumptive unknown parameters from their known (or estimated) distribu-
tions, and averaging the resultant optimal paths from many different draws. When used in conjunction
with commonly applied normal distributions for unknown parameters, this has often led to the conclusion
that uncertainty does not substantially affect optimal climate policies (see e.g. Hope [2006], Richels et al.
[2004], Anthoff et al. [2009], Nordhaus [2008], Anthoff and Tol [2013], Hof et al. [2008], Roughgarden
and Schneider [1999] ).
Given the incoherent optimal policies that result when applying this method, the recent literature ap-
pears to have largely abandoned the search for optimal policies and used this method solely to investigate
a range of outcomes under uncertainty for an exogenously given policy, often focusing on the resulting
uncertainty in the social cost of carbon (SCC) as a metric of policy stringency (Dietz and Asheim [2012],
Gerlagh and Liski [2016], Ackerman and Stanton [2012], Hof et al. [2008], Anthoff and Tol [2013],
Nordhaus [2018]). A novel approach within the Monte Carlo literature is explored in Gillingham et al.
[2018], which applies 6 IAMs (DICE, FUND, GCAM, MERGE, IGSM, and WITCH) in an extensive
Monte Carlo analysis. This work examines parametric as well as model uncertainty and is also novel in
the sense that it estimates surface-response functions to parametric uncertainty.
The second approach (called the “ex-post” approach) consists of modeling uncertainty as being “per-
sistent”, being an intrinsic part of the decision making process, and each period’s decision must be made
prior to realization of uncertain aspects of the model. A variety of interesting and new concepts arise here,
including learning and the value of information, which have recently been explored in the literature (e.g.
Gerlagh and Liski [2016], Karp and Zhang [2006], Lemoine [2021]). This way of introducing uncertainty
often leads to recursive solution approaches, typically the use of stochastic dynamic programming (SDP),
which provides a framework for accommodating different sources of uncertainty and can also help inves-
tigate important aspects not highlighted here (e.g. non-exponential discounting). A major challenge with
this approach, however, relates to computational feasibility with regard to the dimensions of the state
space encountered in IAMs (dimensions larger than four are computationally very challenging). These
challenges have recently been dealt with either by state-space reduction of DICE (e.g. Traeger [2014], Cai
et al. [2015]), enabling efficient computation, or by a regression-based simulation approach (the LSMC)
enabling more rapid computations (Ikefuji et al. [2020]) with a few uncertain parameters.
In essence, current methodological choices to integrating uncertainty in optimal decisions making
in IAMs have been to either apply the intrinsically incoherent Monte Carlo approach or to reduce state
space dimension of IAMs rendering the recursive SDP solution numerically feasible (or to use a rela-
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tively involved LSMC setting when only a few parameters are uncertain). We use an approach that may
be considered a complement to the SDP approach. This approach is coherent from a decision making
perspective while being more computationally tractable and straight forward than the SDP approach, and
feasible with larger state spaces than the DICE2016R. We use a modified ex-ante approach to uncertainty,
termed “state-contingent” in Pizer [1999], with uncertainty arising from parametric uncertainty (i.e. key
model parameters are uncertain with known distributions). In our setting, for each of (say) 1000 “states
of the world”, possible values of uncertain parameters are drawn from respective (known or estimated)
distributions, with each state having a specified probability. The policy maker then maximizes the ob-
jective function, which is a weighted (by state probability) sum of utility in each state, and chooses his
control variables. Thus, the optimization is ex-post, given the known range of uncertain outcomes (and
can be seen as a mild form of preference aggregation across states).
Pizer [1999] shows that this approach to uncertainty is more natural and makes a substantive differ-
ence to policies compared to the more common ex-ante (Monte Carlo) approach. Since the policy maker
optimizes taking into consideration different states of the world, computational feasibility is an important
issue and is directly related to the size of the state and control space. Computational feasibility is main-
tained, however, both due to the smaller state space–the model developed there is not a typical IAM–as
well as the use of a closed form approximately optimal consumption rule (implying in particular that the
recursive optimization part is never carried out)4. Our approach differs from both the Monte Carlo, with
optimization carried out ex-post, and the SDP, with a larger state space (seven instead of a maximum of
four) and greater number of controls (four instead of two). We also outline a way of accommodating
preference heterogeneity (differences in risk preferences) in a manner consistent with existing dynamic
welfare frameworks.
We allow eight parameters identified as relevant within an IAM framework to be uncertain. These
parameters pertain to five core aspects of the model: economic uncertainty, climatic uncertainty, damage
uncertainty, population uncertainty and uncertainty over risk preferences. Also departing from much
of current literature (which focuses largely on normal distributions), we allow for a range of plausible
distributions for parameters, including those with skew and/or heavier tails. Previous analyses allowing
for heavy-tailed distributions focused entirely on uncertainty surrounding either climate sensitivity and
damages (Ackerman et al. [2010], Dietz [2011], Ackerman and Stanton [2012], Anthoff and Tol [2014])5
or damages, emissions-output ratio and technological efficiency (Ikefuji et al. [2020]). Our study is
oriented towards developing an IAM that is capable of addressing many of the drawbacks of treatment of
uncertainty in IAMs and is broader in scope than prior studies, covering larger sets of parameters (eight
in total) while simultaneously choosing an optimal policy that takes into account parametric uncertainty.
4 We note that the approach in Pizer [1999] may be considered a hybrid, in that there is also persistent or structural uncertainty
in the model (via a productivity shock)
5 In the FUND model applied in Anthoff and Tol [2013] all parameters are varied and hence the fat tails found in the Monte
Carlo analyses in FUND are a result of combinations of parameter draws, rather than an assumed fat tailed distribution as
input.
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In most IAMs, including DICE (Nordhaus [2018]), WITCH (Bosetti et al. [2006]) and MERGE
(Manne et al. [1995]), welfare is represented by CRRA utility that, in combination with heavy-tailed
distributions for consumption, can imply infinite expected utility and infinite marginal expected utility,
which is the conceptual crux of Weitzman [2009]’s “Dismal Theorem” applied to essentially deterministic
IAMs. While convenient for many reasons, this form of the utility function is unsuited for the application
to climate change, as has been repeatedly emphasized (see discussion in section 2.2). In this context,
Ikefuji et al. [2011,0] (and Millner [2013], for a more analytical model) indicate that once the convenience
of the CRRA form of utility is discarded, and an appropriately bounded utility function is used, heavy
tailed distributions leading to low consumption can be accommodated. We adopt the so-called Burr or
Pareto utility function, which at typically observed consumption levels behaves like the CRRA function
whereas at more extreme (low) utility levels, behaves like the exponential function (see Ikefuji et al.
[2013] and Ikefuji et al. [2020]), instead of the more common CRRA form.6
Our results suggest that uncertainly exerts a significant effect on optimal climate policy: mitigation
and adaptation are both sensitive to uncertainty, with uncertainty regarding the damage function and cli-
mate sensitivity exerting the greatest effect. Broadly speaking, climate policies become more aggressive
with uncertainty, meaning that they are shifted forward in time: the SCC rises more steeply over time
with uncertainty and full mitigation occurs earlier. Furthermore, mitigation and adaptation are more sen-
sitive to uncertainty in different parameters, and mitigation in particular is very sensitive to uncertainty.
Monte Carlo approaches to accommodating uncertainty not only underestimate the effects of parame-
ter uncertainty but are also “incoherent”, and suggest lower mitigation and adaptation levels than the
no-uncertainty case.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the details of the model, including a descrip-
tion of the utility and welfare functions, and the necessity of a dynamic welfare framework. Section 3
describes the distributions used for key parameters and compares them with those used in the recent lit-
erature. Section 4 presents the key results of the model and Section 5 concludes with a discussion on the
implications of our findings in the broader context of climate change policy.
2 The AD-DICE2016 model
Here we present a very brief description of the key aspects of AD-DICE2016. AD-DICE2016 replicates
the DICE2016-R2 model in terms of the description of economic production and growth, the climate
system, emissions and mitigation. We refer the reader to the Supplementary Appendix for complete
model equations. Here we focus on the elements of AD-DICE2016 that differ from DICE-2016R2 and
6 We note that the only alternative function that has been used is by Dietz and Asheim [2012]. That study however uses a
non-utilitarian welfare measure, rendering comparisons of pure functional forms in a discounted utility framework–such as
ours–rather difficult. Alternatives to the power function have usually been the log utility function (e.g. Gerlagh and Liski
[2016]), which imposes a stronger form of CRRA, fixing risk aversion (inter-temporal elasticity of substitution) at unity, and
recursive utility (or Epstein-Zin preferences, Traeger [2014], Crost and Traeger [2013]), which (at least as used thus far) has
similar features to the CRRA.
5
discuss the inclusion of adaptation, the utility function and welfare representation, and finally our method
of implementing uncertainty.
2.1 Adaptation
Adaptation is an important policy option that is often overlooked in the IAM literature. Only in the last
decade or so have IAMs started to include adaptation as a policy option (e.g. AD-DICE (de Bruin et al.
[2009a]), AD-RICE (de Bruin [2011]), AD-MERGE (Bahn et al. [2019]) and AD-WITCH (Bosello et al.
[2010]). However, adaptation has thus far never been explored with uncertain parameters in an IAM
setting.
The AD-DICE2016 model extends the original DICE-2016 model by incorporating both reactive
adaptation (modeled as a flow variable) and proactive adaptation (modeled as a stock variable). The costs
and benefits of flow adaptation are realized within the same period, whereas stock adaptation requires
a build up of adaptation stock which reduces damages in the future, creating a stream of benefits. Ex-
amples of reactive adaptation measures are crop changes, the use of mosquito nets and air conditioning.
Examples of proactive adaptation are R&D into new crop species, building of sea walls, and the ex-
pansion of irrigation infrastructure. By incorporating both mitigation and adaptation as policy choices,
the AD-DICE2016 model creates the opportunity to study both mitigation and adaptation strategies si-
multaneously. A detailed description of the AD-DICE/AD-RICE modelling of adaptation is provided in
de Bruin [2011].
AD-DICE2016 is calibrated based on the assumption of optimal adaptation in the DICE2016 model.
Hence the net damages in DICE-2016 represent a combination of residual damages (damages after adap-
tation) and adaptation costs for the optimal level of adaptation. In this sense, AD-DICE2016 with
adaptation applied optimally replicates the DICE-2016 baseline results and AD-DICE2016 with both
adaptation and mitigation applied optimally replicates the DICE-2016 optimal (mitigation) results. The
AD-DICE2016 model disaggregates the net damage function of DICE-2016 into residual damages and
adaptation costs, and the relevant functional forms are calibrated based on the literature detailing the
costs and benefits of adaptation. A gross damage function is estimated first, representing climate change
damages before adaptation measures are taken, where damages (expressed as a fraction of gross output)
are defined as a function of temperature change from 1900 (T Et) :
GDt = α1TAT,t +α2T
α3
AT,t ,
where α2 > 0 and α3 > 1. Residual damages, i.e. damages after adaptation, depend on both the gross






Both forms of adaptation are imperfect substitutes for each other, and are aggregated using a Constant
Elasticity of Substitution (CES) function. Together with the residual damages function, this describes
how adaptation expenditures reduce the damages caused by climate change:





where SADt is the total amount of adaptation capital stock at time t and FADt is the amount spent on
reactive adaptation in period t. Furthermore, ρ = (σ−1)/σ is the elasticity of substitution between stock
and flow adaptation, with β ∈ [0,1], ρ ∈ (−∞,1] and γ1,γ2 > 0. Adaptation capital stock is accumulated
in the same manner as conventional capital stock:
SADt+1 = (1−δk)SADt + IADt ,
where δk is the depreciation rate and IADt are the investments in stock adaptation. The total adaptation
costs in each period are thus
PCt = FADt + IADt .
The model is calibrated so that in the optimal run the total adaptation costs plus residual damages equal
the net damages of the DICE-2016 model.
2.2 Adaptation and mitigation interactions
Adaptation and mitigation represent different approaches to reducing the impact of climate change on the
economy. An understanding of how these policies differ in terms of when and how and they affect climate
impacts will be helpful in interpreting our results. We explore these differences briefly here. We recall
that a key difference between adaptation and mitigation is that adaptation can reduce damages associated
with a given level of climate change without limiting climate change itself, whereas mitigation limits
climate change (and helps avoids future damages). When higher uncertainty regarding climate impacts
are likely at higher levels of climate change, mitigation, which can prevent large temperature increases,
has a higher potential to limit these large uncertainties. In consequence, these two policy choices also
differ in the timing of cost outlays and benefits reaped. For mitigation, there is a long delay between the
initial cost outlays and the resulting reduction in climate impacts. 7 In contrast, benefits from adaptation
are realised in a shorter time frame: Flow adaptation benefits are felt immediately (in the same period
these costs are incurred) and stock adaptation benefits are reaped from the period after investments in
adaptation capital are made onward.
To illustrate these differences explicitly, we implement an equal increase in spending on each alter-
native at a point in time and examine the flow of benefits resulting from this one-time increase in outlay.
More specifically, we first compute the unrestricted optimal policy (optimal mitigation and flow/stock
7 Mitigation reduces current emissions, reducing current concentration of GHG emission in the atmosphere, in turn lowering

























































Figure 1: Benefits in terms of reduces damages over time for a one shot increase in mitigation, flow
adaptation and stock adaptation spending of 7% of GDP in the period 2025-2035.
adaptation levels and costs), and then implement an identical and exogenous increase in spending on
each alternative for one time period only (2025-2035, a ten year period that represents one time-step of
the model). In all cases the other policy options are fixed at their optimal levels already computed. In each
case, the change in the residual damages over the model horizon that results from this change illustrate
when (and for how long) the benefits of this spending are realized. The increase considered (to 7% of
GDP) is in all cases larger than the optimal.
The resulting reduction in residual damages (in percentage of GDP) for each policy are displayed in
fig. 1. As evident from the figure, mitigation benefits increase initially and peak around 2150, after which
the reduction in damages remains constant for the next few decades. Thus, while mitigation benefits
accrue from the period after the expenditures occur, the bulk of the benefits are realised in generations to
come. In the case of flow adaptation, benefits are only felt in the period in which they are enforced. For
stock adaptation the realised benefits are highest in the period after investment and reduce sharply after
several periods, but continue up to 2100.8
Adaptation and mitigation policies may be considered both complements to, and substitutes for, one
another. They are complements in the sense that their different characteristics ensure that both are likely
to form non-trivial part of any optimal climate policy, since adaptation may be used to more effectively
address challenges in the shorter term while mitigation has the advantage of providing a stream of benefits
into the future. They may also be considered substitutes in the sense that they compete for the same
resources and an increase in mitigation is likely to reduce the marginal benefits of adaptation (and vice
8 The difference in the time profile of benefits make the choice between adaptation and mitigation dependent on the discount
rate chosen. Clearly, higher discount rates favour adaptation over mitigation and vice-versa, as has been illustrated in the
literature see e.g. de Bruin et al. [2009b] and de Bruin et al. [2009a].
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versa). These mechanisms have been illustrated in previous literature de Bruin et al. [2009b] and de Bruin
et al. [2009a].
2.3 Utility Function and its Parameterisation
As briefly discussed in section 1, we use the Burr utility function in AD-DICE2016. The challenges
of using unbounded utility functions when assessing problems with long time horizons (such as climate
change) and possibly unbounded outcome distributions have been highlighted in e.g. Weitzman [2009]
and Pindyck [2013]. Given that many studies have highlighted the benefits of moving away from the
restrictive CRRA-type utility for climate change in particular, we highlight the benefits of using a more







, λ ,κ > 0, (1)




, µ 6= 0,1. (2)
Where λ and κ are the Burr utility parameters and µ is the elasticity of marginal utility. The Burr
utility function in eq. (1), detailed in Ikefuji et al. [2013] (where it is called “pareto utility”), is a two-
parameter utility function with several interesting properties of which we briefly mention the following; it
is bounded from above and below (by 0 and 1 respectively), and in general behaves like the CRRA utility
function remote from the origin and like the exponential utility function near the origin (as is evident
from fig. B.2 for consumption close to zero). As a result, it is better behaved than the commonly used
CRRA utility function when consumption is close to zero, and is more appropriate when considering
risk with heavy tails.9 For AD-DICE2016, we calibrate the Burr utility function so as to resemble the
behaviour of the CRRA utility function used in DICE-2016R2 at typically observed consumption levels.
We choose the parameterization of k = 0.602 and λ = 7.593 for the Burr function to obtain very similar
utility function to that in DICE-2016R2 (with µ = 1.45) over almost the entire range of consumption.




, implying RRA(0) = 0 and RRA(∞) = κ + 1; and (ii) bounded marginal utility, as can be
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(b) Optimal mitigation (emissions reduced as fraction of
total emissions)
Figure 2: Comparing Burr and CRRA utility functions
As fig. 2a shows, marginal utility10 –which plays a key role in choice of optimal climate policy–differs
significantly between the CRRA and the Burr, exponential utility functions: the Burr reduces slowly from
its maximum of 1 (similar to the exponential); the CRRA begins at very large values (being unbounded)
close to zero consumption and falls to very low values for consumption levels at which the other two still
have relatively large values of MU.
Figure 2b shows the optimal mitigation in DICE-2016R2 with CRRA utility, DICE2016R with our
specified Burr Utility function as well as the AD-DICE2016 with the Burr utility function.11 It is evident
from the figure that the difference between the CRRA and our parameterization of the Burr utility function
is negligible. Furthermore, the difference between the AD-DICE2016 mitigation path (with optimal
adaptation and Burr utility) does not differ significantly from that for the original DICE-2016R2 (with
Burr utility).
We note that the choice of a bounded Burr utility function enables us to allow for, and explore,
the possibility of consumption falling to very low values when distributions with heavier tails than the
normal are used. Over the “normal” range of model outcomes, the Burr and the CRRA yield very similar
quantitative and qualitative outcomes, as also indicated in Ikefuji et al. [2011] who use a simplified and
10 The figure presents normalised values of marginal utility, where each utility function’s marginal utility is normalised by
its corresponding value at c = 0.1. This normalisation merely ensures that very large values of CRRA marginal utility are
comparable to those of the other two utility functions (whose marginal utility, recall, are bounded). It mechanically follows
from the normalisation that the marginal utility of all three utility functions are identical at c = 0.1.
11 Different versions of DICE have been used as a benchmark in different studies in the literature. Our interest is in enriching
DICE in a variety of ways, and consequently, we benchmark our model and results with, where possible, those of the latest
version of DICE, DICE-2016R2. The differences between this model and its predecessors is detailed in Nordhaus [2017].
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two-period version of DICE with the CRRA and Burr utility and in Ikefuji et al. [2020], who use the
DICE2016R with a recursive approach to uncertainty (with what they term“light tails”).
2.4 Welfare Framework
We use a utilitarian approach to social welfare, similar to the analysis in Pizer [1999]; however, our
approach will be somewhat different from the rather static approach used there. To see why an explicit
framework for social welfare is necessary, we begin by observing that there are essentially two types
of uncertainties involved in our framework: the first is induced by uncertainty over (non-preference)
parameters; the second is over preferences, induced by uncertain preference parameters. If the only
uncertainty were over non-preference parameters, then no aggregation and social welfare function is
needed, one can simply work with population-weighted expected utility (as in many stochastic variants
of the DICE model). The introduction of uncertainty over preference parameters necessitates some form
of aggregation over different “types” of preferences in different “states of nature” (in preference terms).
The simplest form of preference aggregation is provided by Harsanyi’s theorem on Social Aggrega-
tion for a static setting, and is used in Pizer [1999] (see section A for a brief overview). In view of that
static setting being unsuitable for a dynamic framework, we use instead newly developed aggregation
principles for dynamic decision-making. In the context of dynamic choice under uncertainty, aggregation
of preferences is a rather tricky affair. We only point out a few issues involved and the implications for our
setting, and refer to Zuber [2011], Jackson and Yariv [2015] for details regarding recent developments.
We note that our framework closely follows that in Zuber [2011].
Society is composed of M “individuals” (they will be defined formally below) and uncertainty over
consumption arises from parametric uncertainty. An uncertain consumption stream arising from a generic





12 Individuals compare an infinite stream of uncertain











with ui and δ the individual i’s Bernoulli utility function and discount factor respectively.
This is the usual expected infinite stream of utility, with the usual properties. The important question
to be answered is: what are the assumptions needed on social ordering of the “individual” consumption
streams (in eq. (3)) to yield an inter-temporal version of Harsanyi’s aggregation theorem for the static
case (presented in equation A.1). Zuber [2011] (Proposition 3) shows that if social aggregation respects a
Paretian principle and if the social planner’s preferences are also vNM, then social preferences satisfying
12 We abstract away from many issues, such as that related to the cardinality of the consumption set, and direct the reader
to Zuber [2011, §2] for a fuller account of the theory. Note also that individual i’s consumption stream being possibly





. For notational simplicity, we do not index
the consumption streams by individual indices and also omit the superscipt L. Note also that all expectations are implicitly
assumed to be w.r.t the lottery L, written as EL.
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reasonable properties (stationarity and history-independence) are of the weighted utilitarian form13













ui (ct), the “social Bernoulli utility function”.14 In other words, society evaluates an
uncertain consumption stream using an expected vNM-Bergson type of SWF,15 with period social welfare
an unweighted sum of individual utilities in that period. Note in particular that the entire framework (in (3)




In summary, we allow preference parameters other than the discount rate to vary and fix the discount rate.
Preference uncertainty is accommodated by allowing the utility functions of “individuals” to differ
in a specific way, whose essence is easily explained: if M is the number of unique combinations of
the preference parameters, then each preference parameter combination represents an “individual”, and
eq. (4) represents a coherent way of deriving an explicit welfare function that accounts for preference
uncertainty. We focus on the coefficient of relative risk aversion as the preference parameter of interest,
and allow the functional parameter of Burr utility that controls the RRA to have a “fat tailed” distribution
(the Pareto, see section 3.4).
2.5 Accommodating parameter uncertainty: The State-contingent Approach
Choosing the optimal policy under uncertainty means that decisions in each period must be made prior to
realization of the (random) parameters of the model. The two prominent reasons for uncertainty arising in
climate change applications relate to state evolution (e.g. random shocks to state variables) and parameter
uncertainty (true value of key parameters being unknown), where parameters can take values from known
distributions. Stochastic dynamic programming (SDP), is the approach that can best capture stochastic
behavior when uncertainty arises from recursively expressed state transition. This approach, which suffers
13 In the dynamic version of welfare from eq. (4), note that the weights, ωi in equation in A.1 are all set to 1.
















Thus, the evaluation over time may, to a first approximation, be thought of as a sum of the static evaluation. Of course, two
differences are apparent: first, that the weights are now unity, for each individual and second, each individual can differ in
attitude to risk and to consumption over time (since the ui vary by individual i) but not over the discount factor, δ .
15 Note that, strictly speaking, this SWF is actually ordinal since no conditions rendering utilities comparable (as in the static
setting) are imposed. This is evident since utilities are unweighted.
16 This is a very strong requirement and cannot be dispensed with; Jackson and Yariv [2015] show, in a setting with no uncer-
tainty, that not imposing this requirement leads to plans which are present-biased and history-dependent in a particular way,
while Zuber [2011] cites examples to show that this represents inter-temporal indifference to consumption inequality.
12
from the so-called “curse of dimensionality”,17 has been applied with modified forms of IAMs in e.g.
Traeger [2014], Cai et al. [2012] and Cai et al. [2015].
The approach we use is a form of non-recursive stochastic programming, suited for cases where the
distribution of outcomes (in our case parameters) is independent of both the actions/controls (mitigation
and adaptation, in our case) and state variables. Thus, the key conceptual difference between the recursive
formulation (via SDP) and the state-contingent approach is that the states of the world, which are known
in advance (i.e. can be enumerated), cannot be affected by actions taken (e.g. policies chosen) in previous
periods. As a result, this is not a framework suited for application to a model where the state variable
is uncertain (e.g. is subject to random evolution), since in such an instance the evolution of the state
variable must depend upon its current value and upon current policy. On the other hand, it is ideally
suited for a framework, such as ours, where parameters are uncertain, since the decision maker’s actions
(e.g. mitigation policies) cannot affect the (denumerable) parameter distribution (e.g. distribution of
climate sensitivity).18
In the state-contingent approach, the objective function is a weighted sum of the utility in each state;
in other words, utility for each possible realization of the parameters is computed for that period, and the
weighted sum of this utility is the maximand. An advantage of this approach over SDP is that stochastic
models with larger state space can be accommodated; on the other hand, the drawbacks include an inabil-
ity to accommodate recursive features of uncertainty (as already referred to) or other interesting features
such as (structural) learning regarding parameters. Despite its advantages, to our knowledge only one
study, Pizer [1999], has applied this approach to integrated assessment models. Pizer [1999] presents a
framework for determining optimal climate change policy under uncertainty and his model is essentially
a modified DICE, using contingent utility (subject to the proviso in footnote 3).
Implementation of this approach is conceptually straight forward: the “uncertain states of the world”
are the possible values of the parameters. Assuming that the parameters are independent, a draw (of size J)
is obtained from their marginal distributions in time period 1.19 It is not known however which state will
actually occur, so the policy maker has to take the multiple potential futures into account. Optimisation
is ex-post, in that the optimal policy takes into account the many possible states of the world. Thousands
of states are used to simultaneously determine the optimal policies for each scenario. A large number of
states of the world is necessary to explore the realistic policy consequences of uncertainty, else important
aspects related to interaction between the parameter space and the model may be overlooked. A simplified
outline of the utility structure is given below (the complete version is provided in the Supplementary
17 The “curse” refers to the fact that the computational time and space required for solving dynamic programming problems
numerically rises exponentially with the dimension of the state space (in terms of the number of state variables). In practice,
computing optimal policies becomes impractical with more than four state variables.
18 In the literature on stochastic IAMs, we are unaware of any study that deviates from the assumption that parameters are
fundamentally a fixed number independent of our actions; it is the actual value of the parameter that is unknown. In models
with learning, this true-but-unknown value is potentially knowable after some experimentation.
19 This is essentially the “naı̈ve” random sampling of individual parameters. We do not pursue more involved sampling ap-
proaches (e.g. the Latin Hypercube) since it is not clear that in cases such as ours, with as many as 8 variables random, and
with only a single draw of them all, the LH approach provides any benefits.
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Appendix), which includes two illustrative state variables, one for capital stock (Kt) and one for climate-
related components (MAT,t):
max







s.t. Kt+1 = f (Kt , It)
MAT,t+1,s = f (MAT,t,s,MUP,t,s, It ,MUt ,θ)
(5)
where Kt is capital stock, MAT,t,s,MUP,t,s represent the the atmospheric and upper ocean layer concen-
tration of CO2 at time t and state s, Ws is welfare, index s = {1, ...N} represents states of the world (at
most N), θ ∈ {θ1, . . . ,θN} is a draw of an uncertain parameter vector from the set of all possible values
while investment It , mitigation MUt , flow adaptation FADt and stock adaptation IADt are the decision






where u(.) is the Burr utility function defined in section 2.3 and Rt is the discount factor. We note that
our model has seven state variables, with the four controls mentioned here.
3 Quantifying parameter uncertainty
Our model includes over 70 parameters. Based upon a variety of factors, including availability of knowl-
edge enabling parameterisation, we choose eight parameters to treat as uncertain.20 These parameters are
listed in table 3, along with typical estimates of location and scale values and distributions used in the
literature. We categorise these parameters into five groups, based on their role in the model: Economic
(denoted ECO), climatic (CLIM), damages (DAM), population (POP) and risk (RISK). Each group of
parameters corresponds to different components of the climate-economy cycle. As already alluded to
above, most modeling studies incorporating parameter uncertainty typically consider only a subset of the
parameters below as being uncertain at a time (Ackerman et al. [2010], Dietz [2011], Dietz and Asheim
[2012], Ackerman and Stanton [2012], Roughgarden and Schneider [1999], Anthoff et al. [2009],Ikefuji
et al. [2020]). In essence, that approach can be considered a moderate “robustness check” of the model
rather than as an exploration of the implications of joint parameter spaces on climate policy that we
undertake. 21
20 We have chosen to not include uncertainty over the costs associated with adaptation and mitigation, chiefly since the data for
these are largely unknown, making the task of assigning probability distributions more challenging.
21 The recent study of Dietz et al. [2017] considers as many (or more) parameters uncertain as we do. However, the focus there
is very different, on estimating the (CAPM theory-derived) “climate beta”. Consequently, there is no notion of “optimality”
in the sense commonly used, much less a discussion of mitigaton and policy in the standard IAM sense.
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Other studies include a more substantial set of uncertain parameters, but assume normally distributed
parameters, around a rather narrow variance (see e.g. Hof et al. [2008], Hope [2006]). Some studies in-
clude uncertainty over all model parameters with the drawback of not only applying normal distribution
but also assuming equal distributions for all parameters (Anthoff and Tol [2013], Anderson et al. [2014]).
Turning to studies most directly related to our work, many of the chosen distributions in Pizer [1999] have
compact support while the distributions in Nordhaus [2008,0,0] and Gillingham et al. [2018] are gener-
ally normal. This is rather a strong assumption, ruling out “extreme” model outcomes in the expected
utility setting underpinning all IAMs. These assumptions have often been criticised, see e.g. Weitzman
[2009], Pindyck [2013], Stern [2013], as problematic, being both incoherent in theory and in the resulting
dependence of policy choices upon ad-hoc distributional bounds. We carry out a more extensive simula-
tion exercise, differing from the existing literature in using distributions reflecting the underlying nature
of the parameters, a few of which have “fat tails”. In any case, prior studies investigating the effects of
parameter uncertainty upon climate policy lack a coherent link between uncertainty and climate policy,
while studies in which uncertainty is central to climate policy (e.g. Traeger [2014], Cai et al. [2012], Ike-
fuji et al. [2020] and Cai et al. [2015]) have focused on model structures which are simplified in certain
dimensions and focus on only a few parameters and do not undertake an extensive exercise in identifying
the effect of different sources of uncertainty.
We note that our choice of distributions and their parameters draws upon the (by now large) literature
in economics that has developed around understanding how uncertainty affects different aspects of climate
policy. In particular, our choice of distributions follows either from the characteristics required of certain
phenomena (e.g. “fat-tailed” distributions for climate sensitivity) or what is considered most sensible,
largely for reasons of non-negativity (e.g. truncated normal and triangular). Similarly, the distributional
parameters are drawn based upon best estimates in the scientific (for e.g. climate sensitivity, transfer
coefficient) or economic (for e.g. the coefficient of risk aversion) literature. In light of the independence
of parameters,22 we draw from respective marginal distributions whose choice we turn now to discuss.
3.1 Damage Exponent
The damage function links temperature increases to losses in output and is typically quadratic (e.g. DICE-
2016 in Nordhaus [2017] and Nordhaus [2018] and many other integrated assessment models) with the
form α1Tt +α2T 2t . This functional form not only lacks empirical support but is also limiting at higher
temperature increases, yielding improbably low damage estimates. For instance, both Ackerman et al.
[2010] and Weitzman [2011] have shown that with Nordhaus’ values of the damage exponent, a 5◦C
warming results in a loss of utility equivalent to 6% of output, which is unreasonably low (see also Stern
[2013, §3.2.1]), while Hanemann [2009] provides a detailed argument of why damages in the DICE
22 Given that varying each parameter in a large-dimensional-parameter-space setting is computationally challenging (since the
number of runs will be the product of the number of simulations for each parameter), some form of simplification is essential
to render computations feasible. We make the (mild) assumption that parameter distributions are independent of one another.
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models are under-estimated. Weitzman (Weitzman [2012, §3]) suggests a damage function with the
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(a) Triangular distribution for damage






















(b) Damage function for different values of damage
exponent.
Figure 3: Properties of the damage function in AD-DICE2016.
We use instead the functional form α1Tt +α2T
α3
t , which allows for a wider range of damage possibil-
ities, and allow the exponent α3 to be a random variable. In view of the non-negativity of this parameter,
we choose the triangular distribution, which is often preferred under these conditions (Kotz and Van Dorp
[2004]), and has also been used in many studies on climate change (e.g. Ackerman et al. [2010]). As to
the support of this distribution, a lower bound of 2 is conventional and the upper end of the support can be
fixed by understanding the sensitivity of damages to changes in the exponent: we plot damage (fraction of
output) as a function of temperature increase for different values of the damage exponent α3 (fig. 3b). An
exponent of 7 leads to an almost vertical damage curve, and we choose a max of 5 (where damages are
near-vertical). In this case, gross damages would be approximately 2.5% of GDP (excluding adaptation)
at a 2◦C temperature increase, 62% of GDP at a 4◦C increase and 186% at a 5◦C increase. Finally, a
choice of center = 3.3 yields a mean of 3.4, this is consistent with the base value in the AD-DICE2016
model23
23 We note a few properties of the triangular distribution, a continuous distribution with finite support. Denoting by a and b < ∞
the support, and by c the “most likely value” (i.e. mode of the distribution), of a random variable X with the triangular












if c≤ x≤ b
,
with mean µ =
a+b+ c
3
(see eq (1.22), Kotz and Van Dorp [2004] for an expression for the variance).
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Turning to a brief comparison with other studies, Nordhaus [2018] introduces uncertainty over the
coefficient on the second-order term (α2), using a normal distribution with mean 0.00227 and standard
deviation of 0.00135. Ackerman et al. [2010] uses the same functional form as we do for the damage
function, with the exponent a random variable following the triangular distribution with min= 1, max= 5
and center= 2, yielding a mean of 2.95. Dietz and Asheim [2012] use the damage function α1Tt +α2T 2t +
α4T 7t , introducing an ad-hoc high-order term to capture the extreme non-linearity at large temperature
levels and a normal distribution for its coefficient α4 (an effect that may be accommodated instead by
higher powers of T). Pizer [1999] uses a quadratic damage function and models uncertainty by using
a discrete distribution with 5 values for the coefficient of the second-order term. Finally, Ikefuji et al.
[2020] use a quadratic damage function (with α1 = 0) with a student-t distribution for α2 with the d.o.f.
parameter of 10 (parameter values for σ are not reported, with µ possibly being unbounded).
To summarize, the form of the damage function we use, along with the range of the distribution
for the damage exponent, allows for stronger damages than in many prior studies, and responds to the
criticism in Stern [2013] regarding substantial underestimation of damages. The choice of a commonly
used damage function, along with a transparent way of allowing damages to scale with temperature
change, also addresses, to an extent, the criticisms of IAMs in Pindyck [2013] regarding unrealistic and
ad-hoc choice of damage functions.
3.2 Climate Sensitivity
The climate sensitivity parameter, which governs the relationship between atmospheric CO2 concentra-
tions and the global mean temperature, measures the equilibrium response of temperature to a doubling
of atmospheric CO2 concentration. It is a key parameter because it captures the climate system’s response
to variations in the Earth’s radiation balance caused by changes in atmospheric CO2. If climate sensitivity
is high, relatively small changes in CO2 concentrations could produce very significant warming effects,
with severe consequences for both human society and planetary ecology.
The IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report has compiled a number of recent estimates of the climate
sensitivity parameter, and an inspection of the 18 probability density functions in box 10.2 in Meehl
and Stocker [2007] shows that most (if not all) of them have a positive skew and a “fat tail” of high
estimates. The IPCC concludes that the climate sensitivity is “likely” (66− 90% chance) to be in the
range of 2− 4.5◦C with a best estimate of about 3◦C, and is “very unlikely” (< 10% chance) to be less
than 1.5◦C. This means that there is a 5− 17% chance that climate sensitivity is greater then 4.5◦C. A
more recent average estimate by fourteen leading climate scientists of the probability of climate sensitivity
being above 4.5◦C is 23% (Zickfield et al. [2010]). This means that a normal distribution of the climate
sensitivity parameter may significantly underestimate the probability of very high values.
17





































































(a) Climate sensitivity distributions: Nordhaus
[2018], Ackerman et al. [2010], Dietz and Asheim
[2012] and AD-DICE2016
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Transfer Coefficient
(b) Truncated-normal distribution for the transfer
coefficient: µ = 0.24,σ = 0.1
Figure 4: Density functions of Climate Sensitivity and the Tranfer Coefficient
We use a lognormal distribution with µ = 1.34,σ = 0.5 chosen to match the estimations compiled by
IPCC as closely as possible (see 4a). Most other studies also use log normal distributions with compara-
ble, yet slightly less “fat tailed” distributions, with distributions in studies most directly related illustrated
in fig. 4a (see also Weitzman [2012, Table 1]): Nordhaus [2018] and Gillingham et al. [2018] model
uncertainty by assigning a log-normal distribution (fit to Olson et al. [2012]) with a mean of 3.10 and
a standard deviation of 0.84. Ackerman et al. [2010] and Dietz and Asheim [2012] also use a lognor-
mal distribution. Pizer [1999] uses a discrete distribution with 5 values almost symmetrically centered
around the value 3 (1.5, 2.2, 3, 3.7, 4.5). Tables 1 and 2 presents cumulative probabilities for different
distributions. To summarize, the distribution for climate sensitivity we choose, unlike much of the prior
literature, has tails which are “fat” enough to match the latest scientific estimates.
Model T̂ = 2◦C 4◦C 6◦C 8◦C
Nordhaus [2018] (LN) 0.92 0.12 0.003 0




) 0.90 0.46 0.18 0.070
Ackerman et al. [2010] (LN) 0.73 0.24 0.07 0.022
Dietz and Asheim [2012] (LN) 0.85 0.23 0.038 0.0061
Table 1: Cumulative probabilities for different temperature increases.
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T < 1.5◦ 2≤ T ≤ 4.5◦ T ≥ 4.5◦ Mean
IPCC
“very unlikely” “likely” “cannot be excluded”
3
<10% 66-90% 5-17%
Nordhaus [2018] 0.5% 87% 5% 3.13
AD-DICE2016 (our model) 3.1% 59.8% 37.1% 4.32
Ackerman et al. [2010] 12.3% 70% 17.7% 3.4
Dietz and Asheim [2012] 15% 70% 3.8% 3.2
Table 2: Cumulative probabilities for IPCC temperature ranges.
3.3 Transfer Coefficient in Carbon Cycle
Many integrated assessment models, including DICE2007, AD-DICE2016, Dietz and Asheim [2012] and
Ackerman et al. [2010], model the carbon cycle as having three reservoirs of CO2, the atmosphere, upper
and lower ocean, with carbon flowing in both directions between adjacent layers. The parameters chosen
as key to describe this process is the transfer coefficient between atmosphere and upper ocean; i.e. how
the upper ocean absorbs CO2 from atmosphere.
In our model this transfer coefficient is a random variable which follows a truncated normal distri-
bution [0,1] µ = 0.24,σ = 0.1 (see 4b). Dietz and Asheim [2012] use a normal distribution with the
same parameters as DICE2007 while for Ackerman et al. [2010], the transfer coefficient is not random.
Pizer [1999] uses a simplified version of the carbon cycle model with a discrete distribution (with values
0.5,0.6,0.65,0.7,0.8) for the retention rate for CO2 emissions. Nordhaus [2018] does not apply uncer-
tainty to a climate transfer coefficient but to the level of carbon in the intermediate reservoir (in GtC),
applying a normal distribution.
3.4 Burr Utility Function Parameter
Recall from 2.3 that the Burr utility is a bounded (between 0 and 1) utility function used instead of the
CRRA for its suitability for applications with possibly very low consumption values, and that the Burr
utility function parameters κ and λ are chosen to closely replicate the control variable results of DICE-
2016. The choice of two key aspects of decision making, risk aversion and discount rate, has generated a
large literature; indeed, Pindyck [2013] forcefully criticizes IAMs for the ad hoc choices regarding these
aspects. The welfare framework outlined in 2.4, however, allows an interesting way of side-stepping some
of the criticism involved in the choice of a coefficient of risk aversion. In particular, we are interested
in allowing for uncertainty over risk aversion, with an interpretation of variation in risk preference being
indicative of different individual types (as elaborated in 2.4).




footnote 9 for details), depends upon consumption level, unlike for the commonly used CRRA utility. An
inspection of the effects of κ (fig. 5a) and λ (fig. B.1b) suggests (as is also evident from an inspection
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of the expression for the RRA) that variation in κ induces larger changes in RRA than variation in λ ; as
a result, we introduce uncertainty over the utility parameter κ . We choose the pareto distribution with
parameters k = 0.5, a = 5, resulting in a mean value of 0.626 and a standard deviation of 0.16.24 The
choice of the pareto distribution ensures that relatively large values for κ , implying greater aversion to
risk, are not ruled out; on the other hand, the mean and variance parameters chosen ensure that very
large values of κ , in particular larger than 3, have a very small probability (of 0.00044), as indicated in
fig. 5b. The value of κ = 3 is chosen since it is evident (from fig. B.1a) that utility for low values of c are
indistinguishable for κ > 3.
For all practical purposes, the RRA varies between 1 and 3 (fig. 5a), for values of c even moderately
beyond 0. These bounds on the RRA is also consistent with the commonly used values (usually for the
CRRA utility), which vary from 1 to 3 or 4. 25






































(a) RRA for varying values of κ (λ = 7.5)























(b) Density function for κ: Pareto(k = 0.5,a = 5).
Figure 5: RRA of Burr utility function.
Ackerman et al. [2010] and Nordhaus [2008] use the CRRA utility function with fixed parameters,
RRA µ = 2, and (the pure rate of time preference) ρ = 0.015, while in the DICE-2016R2, the RRA is
reduced to 1.45 (see Nordhaus [2017] for more details). Pizer [1999] also uses a power utility function,
24 We use the standard definition of a pareto distribution: for a random variable X distributed Pareto, the density function is
akax−(a+1), with x ≥ k, k,a > 0, k the scale and a the shape parameter (e.g. p.574, Johnson et al. [1995]). The mean, µ of
this distribution is computed as ak (a−1)−1 for a > 1 (see p.577 of Johnson et al. [1995] for computation of variance, σ2).
25 We note that Ikefuji et al. [2020] use a slightly different parameterisation of Pareto utility for their study: κ = 1.322,λ =
0.0108. Our parameterisation was chosen based upon ensuring that the RRA was reasonably close to the commonly used
values for CRRA utility (of 1.5) for consumption ranges far enough away from 0.
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but introduces uncertainty in both ρ and the RRA, with a mean value of about 1.1 (and a posterior
distribution which appears to be a truncated normal, T N[0,4], see Table 1, §2.4).26
3.5 Other Parameters
We turn next to detailing the distributions of the remaining four parameters. The growth rate of total factor
productivity is modelled as decreasing over time, with the initial growth rate defined as a random variable,
with a truncated normal distribution on [0,1], µ = 0.076,σ = 0.033. Nordhaus [2008], Dietz and Asheim
[2012] and Pizer [1999] also use a truncated normal distribution. However, Nordhaus [2018], Gillingham
et al. [2018] apply a normal distribution resulting in a mean yearly productivity growth of 1.53% and
a standard deviation of 1.12%. Despite the normal distribution being used, the significantly higher s.d.
compared to other studies (including this study), will turn out to be important.
The CO2−equivalent emission-output ratio declines over time as energy efficiency increases. The
initial rate of this decarbonization is a random variable and we use again the truncated normal distri-
bution, with parameters µ = 0.0152,σ = 0.005. We use a triangular distribution for asymptotic global
population, min = 9770, max = 13000, center = 10800, with a mean of 11190 (same as the no uncer-
tainty value), based largely upon the UN report (United Nations (2017)). Dietz and Asheim [2012] and
Nordhaus [2008] use a normal distribution while Pizer [1999] and uses a discrete distribution for an-
nual decline of population growth rate. Nordhaus [2018] treats population level as deterministic while
Gillingham et al. [2018] uses a normal distribution for population level in 2100 (mean of 12.149 billion
and standard deviation of 2.378 billion). For total resources of fossil fuels, which defines the cumulative
limits of carbon use, we use a triangular distribution, min = 5000,max = 8000, center = 5000, with a
mean of 6000 (same as the no uncertainty value). Nordhaus [2008] and Dietz and Asheim [2012] use a
normal distribution instead while it is deterministic in Nordhaus [2018]. An overview of all parameters
treated as random in AD-DICE2016 is provided in table 3.
4 Results
We turn next to presenting the results of our numerical simulations. Before doing so, we briefly discuss
the details of our simulation: we draw randomly from our parameter distributions 1000 times, creating
26 We note that increased value of coefficient of RRA in the CRRA class of utility functions has two distinct and opposing
effects: without uncertainty, µ represents aversion to generational consumption inequality, with larger values implying greater
aversion to inequality and acting thereby to reduce the value of future consumption (since consumption is growing at a
constant rate in DICE); when uncertainty is introduced, µ represents the aversion to risk, and since future consumption is
uncertain, larger values of µ tend to increase the value of future consumption. In terms of the social cost of carbon, which is
discussed in detail in section 4.5, it is not obvious even for the CRRA functional form which of these two effects dominate
(although see Pindyck [2013] for a small analytical exercise). For the functional form we use, and the setting in which
uncertainty is introduced, the latter feature is likely to lead to increases in the coefficient of RRA–which is non-constant,
recall–to lead to more conservative policies, increasing mitigation and the SCC.
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0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30
Growth rate of TFP
(a) Growth rate of TFP: Truncated
Normal, µ = 0.076, σ = 0.033
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10
Rate of decarbonisation
(b) Rate of decarbonisation: Truncated
normal, µ = 0.015, σ = 0.005
10000 10500 11000 11500 12000 12500 13000
(c) Asymptotic Global Population:
Triangular, a = 9770.b = 10800,c =
13000,µ = 11500
5000 5500 6000 6500 7000 7500 8000
(d) Total Resources of Fossil Fuels:
Triangular,
a = 5000,b = 8000,c = 5000,µ = 6000





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1000 equally likely possible states of the world.27 We then optimise our adaptation (flow expenditures
and stock investment), mitigation and capital investments paths over these 1000 states. The damages,
production levels and social cost of carbon etc. associated with the chosen path will vary over states. We
search for an optimal path using the Conopt algorithm in GAMS, which is a non-linear programming
algorithm that uses pivoting based on second order derivatives to find the optimal solution. This approach
is rather different from the value iteration approaches to approximate the value function in dynamic
programming problems based upon the Bellman equation. One benefit of our approach is that state space
reduction is less critical for numerical reasons: recall that our state space dimension (of seven) is larger
than the six in DICE-2016R2 and the four in Traeger [2014]). Similar to all non-linear optimization
algorithms, a disadvantage is that numerical solutions are increasing in the size of the random draws,
meaning that the use of e.g. 10,000 realizations will be numerically practically infeasible.
We focus on five aspects in the discussion of results. First, we present evidence suggesting that, in
practice at least, the presence of “fat-tailed” distributions need not raise concerns when applying IAMs
for policy analysis. Second, we discuss the effects of different sources of uncertainty. Third, we examine
how adaptation and mitigation interact under uncertainty, an aspect not studied thus far in the literature,
an investigation of which can yield important insights. Fourth, we evaluate how the popular Monte Carlo
approach compares, in terms of coherence of policies, to ours. Finally, we present and discuss the social
cost of carbon and how it is affected by uncertainty.
4.1 “Fat-tailed” distributions and climate policy
Weitzman, in his so-called “Dismal Theorem” (Weitzman [2009]) has suggested that policy evaluation
(including IAMs) that use unbounded utility functions may be challenged when using “fat-tailed” distri-
butions that can lead to very low consumption, whose marginal valuation must be unbounded. This raises
challenges that are both modeling-related (needing ad-hoc lower bounds on the marginal WTP, which
determines mitigation) and conceptual (how can such bounds be found and reconciled with a theory of
welfare?). This view has been reinforced in particular in Pindyck [2013] and Pindyck [2017], who devel-
oped further this line of thinking with particular focus on the Social Cost of Carbon, which we investigate
later.
As already mentioned, many studies (e.g. Nordhaus [2011]) suggest that the result is a particular
artifact of the use of CRRA functions, whose properties may not be appropriate to use when addressing
the challenges posed by climate change. We contribute to this debate by considering whether the choice
of utility function will result in different optimal policy pathways under fat-tailed uncertainty. We recall
that our use of “fat-tailed” distribution for climate sensitivity, in conjunction with the damage exponent
being uncertain (and potentially rather large) means that gross damages can reach up to 99.8% of output.
Based purely upon marginal utility considerations, we would expect that the CRRA utility function would
27 We have also run our simulations for 5000 draws and find the results consistent with the 1000-draws presented here. As
a 5000 draw scenario takes far longer (about two weeks) to solve, we have chosen to use a 1000 draw across the different
scenarios.
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result in higher mitigation pathways in order to avoid potential catastrophic damages (entailing collapse of
consumption to very low values). As the Burr utility function bounds marginal utilities (and the coefficient
of risk aversion), one would anticipate lower optimal mitigation levels.
Figure 7 displays the optimal mitigation and adaptation paths with both the Burr and CRRA util-
ity functions (where both climate sensitivity and the coefficient of RRA have “fat-tailed” distributions).
Contrary to our a priori expectations, we find only minimal differences between the optimal mitigation
and adaptation paths for these two utility functions. While our simulations used a moderate-sized draw
(meaning that a very much larger draw may still lead to difficulties with the CRRA utility), our analysis
leads us to suggest that the use of fat-tailed distributions can be accommodated in IAMs and used for



























2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 2110 2120
years
Mitigation (Burr) Mitigation (CRRA)
Adaptation (Burr) Adaptation (CRRA)
Figure 7: Optimal mitigation and adaptation paths with full uncertainty for Burr and CRRA
utility functions) sources of uncertainty.
4.2 Salience of different sources of uncertainty
As detailed in section 3, there are five different sets of uncertain parameters, each corresponding to uncer-
tainty in different components of the climate-economy cycle. In this section, we investigate the degree to
which these different sources of uncertainty affect mitigation and adaptation. We also investigate whether
adaptation and mitigation are affected differently by these different sources of uncertainty, an investiga-
tion that, to our knowledge, has not been carried out before in the literature. Observe that when one set of
parameters is set to be uncertain, all others are fixed at their mean values presented in table 3 (except, ob-
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viously, for the cases of full and no uncertainty). Similarly, when considering mitigation only, adaptation
(stock and flow) is “turned off”, and similar is the case when considering adaptation only.28
The results of our “mitigation-only” model-run are presented in 8a, from which it is evident that
different sources of uncertainty affect optimal mitigation paths differently. Following e.g. Nordhaus
[2008] and Pizer [1999], we anticipate that uncertainty regarding parameters distributed normally and
with linear first order conditions will have no significant effect on the optimal mitigation path. Our results
concerning population growth (which satisfies these conditions), confirms this hypothesis, since this does
not significantly alter the path of mitigation (path omitted from the figure, as being identical to the no-
uncertainty path). When preferences– here the “Burr parameter” κ-are uncertain, the optimal mitigation
path is unaffected (path omitted from figure, as being identical to that for the case of “no uncertainty”).
Pizer [1999], on the other hand, finds that uncertainty in preference parameters (ρ and RRA) can exert
a sizeable effect on optimal policies, with higher levels of mitigation occurring earlier.29One possible
reason for his findings is that ρ is uncertain, which leads to non-linear first order conditions (uncertainty
regarding this parameter has an increasing effect on the effective discount rate over time).
Economic uncertainty (total factor productivity growth, decarbonisation rate and available fossil fu-
els) exerts a sizable effect on economic variables such as output (as in Nordhaus [2018] and Gillingham
et al. [2018]) without leading to a discernible effect on optimal mitigation polices. This result suggests
that it is important to investigate the effect of uncertainty not only on intermediate variables such as output
(as in Nordhaus [2018] and Gillingham et al. [2018]), but also how it affects the optimal policy (which,
for our case at least, is minimal).
Turning next to uncertainty regarding climate (climate sensitivity and the transfer coefficient) and
damage parameters (the damage coefficient), however, we see a very different pattern. Uncertainty re-
garding these two key parameter sets leads to sizeable increases in mitigation, with damage uncertainty
having a stronger effect than climate uncertainty. In particular, the main effect in both cases is increased
mitigation for all time periods, and in particular full mitigation slightly earlier (at 2055) for damage
uncertainty than in the case of no uncertainty (at 2065). While the importance of these two parameter
sets in driving climate change policies has been emphasized, previous findings on this score have been
mixed: more recent studies report that damage uncertainty exerts a sizeable effect on mitigation in a
range of models, from the fully SDP approaches (Crost and Traeger [2013]) to modified DICE-based
MC approach (Ackerman et al. [2010]) while the same effect was not seen in many of the earlier model-
ing studies relying on normal distributions (Nordhaus [2008]) or approximate DP approaches even when
using (slightly) skewed distributions (Pizer [1999]).
28 We note that mitigation to reduce climate change damages is “switched off”, but mitigation as a means of reducing the use
of scarce fossil fuel resources is still available. The level of this mitigation is insignificant except in the case of economic
uncertainty, where uncertainty over the amount of fossil fuel resources available results in significantly higher levels of
mitigation.
29 Other studies that have considered many parameters uncertain, e.g. Dietz and Asheim [2012], do not provide separate analysis
of the importance of uncertainty in different parameter sets.
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Similarly, while many studies emphasize the key role of climate sensitivity and damage parameters,
particularly with heavy tails, in driving climate policy (Ackerman et al. [2010], Ackerman and Stanton
[2012], Dietz [2011]), they do not consider uncertainty over other parameters, making it difficult to iden-
tify what aspect drives key insights. In any case, our results support the broad trends in recent findings:
that uncertainty in these two parameter sets are of key importance for mitigation. As already mentioned,
some recent studies, e.g. Nordhaus [2018] and Gillingham et al. [2018], have emphasised the salience of
uncertainty of economic growth, which may partly be explained by the rather high s.d. chosen: in Nord-
haus [2018], for instance, this is as large as 74% of the mean, whereas it is only 34% on average for the
other four uncertain parameters. Nonetheless, while this does affect economic variables and emissions,
damage uncertainty is reported as being the main driver of variation in the social cost of carbon (followed
by climate sensitivity and productivity growth). Finally, allowing all parameters to be uncertain (“full
uncertainty”) leads to mitigation levels higher than when any particular set of parameters is uncertain,
again highlighting the importance of examining multiple uncertainties together.
Model results for the adaptation-only case are presented in fig. 8b, which presents impacts post-2035
(differences for periods earlier are relatively small). As for mitigation, uncertainty regarding population
and preferences have little effect on optimal adaptation (paths omitted from the figure). It is also evident
that uncertainty in damages and all parameters being uncertain (full uncertainty) have similar impacts,
signalling that damage uncertainty is a key channel through which uncertainty affects adaptation.
The effects of climate uncertainty on adaptation policies are small overall but exhibit patterns different
from mitigation: reductions in adaptation in earlier periods and increases in later periods. This interesting
response is driven by two factors: non-linearity in the effect of climate uncertainty (with climate un-
certainty leading to large variation in temperature changes with concomitant variations in gross damage
across different states-of-world) and the exponentially increasing adaptation cost function (meaning that
a unit of increased adaptation costs more than is saved by a reduction in the same unit of adaptation).
The latter aspect, in fact, means that when moving from a deterministic model (with an “average” level
of gross damage) to an uncertain one with say 1000 states, optimal adaptation may well be reduced. On
the other hand, this same shift from a deterministic to a stochastic model, when considering only the
effect via gross damages (the former channel identified above) is likely to lead to increased adaptation.
In earlier periods of the model runs, the adaptation cost effect dominates the non-linear climate damages
effect.
In later periods, the effect on gross damages (which are exponentially increasing) becomes more
prominent: carbon-emissions drive temperature increases due to the monotonic increase in economic
activity. Due to the considerable time lag between emissions and resulting temperature change (see
section 2.2), impacts peak after approximately 50 years, meaning that changes in climate sensitivity exerts
a stronger effect in later periods. Furthermore, gross damages increase exponentially in temperature (due
to the exponential gross damage function). In later years, the effect of these mechanisms outweigh the
effects of the exponential adaptation cost function and the optimal level of adaptation increases.
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The economic parameters, total factor productivity (TFP) growth, rate of decarbonisation and avail-
able fossil fuels, turn out to have significant effects on adaptation, and we consider the effect of each in
turn. When TFP growth is uncertain, average economic growth increases (since TFP growth has expo-
nential effects on production), which in turn has two competing effects: the first is an obvious increase
in emissions, warranting greater levels of adaptation, ceteris paribus; this is counteracted by the second,
involving reduced marginal utility of consumption over time, leading to an increase in Ramsey discount-
ing (consumption discounting), reducing the size of future impacts leading to reduced stock adaptation
level. A similar effect operates upon the rate of decarbonisation, i.e. uncertainty leads to an average
higher level of decarbonisation, leading to reduced emissions and thus reducing the need for adaptation.
Uncertainty of fossil fuel resources will lead to increased mitigation to reduce fossil fuels usage, leading
to reduced adaptation (see footnote 28). In summary, economic uncertainty has effects upon adaptation in
both directions but overall, we find that the downward pressures dominate, and optimal adaptation level
decreases with economic uncertainty.
We also find that, up to the year 2080, adaptation levels are higher when only damages are uncertain
than when all parameters are uncertain, largely due to economic uncertainty in the latter case leading
to reduced adaptation. These climate and damage uncertainty results are interesting, and illustrate that
different sources of uncertainty do not uniformly affect the direction of adaptation levels. These effects




















(a) Optimal mitigation (without adaptation)





















(b) Optimal adaptation (without mitigation):
different sources of uncertainty.
Figure 8: Adaptation and Mitigation–no interaction.
Mitigation and adaptation are measured as fractions of emission reduction and output respectively.
30 We note that stock and flow adaptation are affected very similarly by parameter uncertainty, and we therefore omit the details
(figures are available upon request).
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4.3 Adaptation and mitigation interactions under uncertainty
To our knowledge, no previous study using an IAM has explored how adaptation and mitigation poli-
cies interact under uncertainty (with the exception of the simplistic analysis in Felgenhauer and de Bruin
[2009]). Figures 9a and 9b present optimal levels of mitigation and adaptation under uncertainty in AD-
DICE2016. We first examine the effect on mitigation. Comparing mitigation with (fig. 9a) and without
(from fig. 8a) adaptation yields several insights: First, mitigation levels are (unsurprisingly) higher with-
out adaptation than with. Second, when adaptation is allowed for, uncertainty over economic parameters
does affect mitigation, with optimal mitigation reduced (the ‘ECO’ curve in is slightly below the ‘No
UNC’ curve beyond 2065 in fig. 9a, whereas it was identical to the ‘No UNC’ curve in fig. 8a). As previ-
ously discussed, uncertainty over economic parameters leads to an increase in both economic growth and
de-carbonisation. Absent the possibility of adapting to climate change, mitigation is higher, with full mit-
igation reached by 2065, while the effects of economic uncertainty only manifest later, post-2065. This
is because, as previously discussed, prior to 2065 increased economic growth resulting from uncertainty
over economic parameters is balanced by an increase in consumption discounting and decarbonisation,
resulting in a negligible effect on mitigation. Post-2065 however, the effects of consumption discount-
ing and decarbonisation dominate that of economic growth, resulting in a reduced need for mitigation.
Absent adaptation, however, the need to mitigate post-2065 is nonetheless very high (i.e. marginal ben-
efits of mitigation far outweigh the costs) and mitigation is limited by the fact that the 100% threshold
(meaning no carbon storage) is reached. Even when economic uncertainty drives down marginal benefits








































Figure 9: Optimal adaptation and mitigation for different sources of uncertainty
Mitigation is in fraction of emissions reduced, adaptation in fraction of damages reduced.
Turning next to adaptation, we compare both adaptation levels and the effect of different sources of
uncertainty when mitigation is allowed (fig. 9b) with when it is not (fig. 8b). This comparison leads to the
following observations: First, adaptation levels are lower with mitigation than without. This is intuitive,
since adaptation must be increased to compensate for increased damages resulting from not mitigating.
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Second, a surprising finding is that adaptation levels are higher when damages are uncertain (fig. 9b)
than when all parameters are (“full uncertainty”), up to year 2090. This was seen in the case of no mit-
igation as well, driven by the impacts of economic uncertainty, however, it is amplified when mitigation
is introduced. This result arises largely due to the timing of mitigation: with all parameters uncertain,
full mitigation (meaning that all emissions are avoided) is reached by 2070, while for the case of uncer-
tainty in damage parameter only, this is reached a decade later. This additional mitigation (between 2070
and 2080) with all parameters uncertain naturally reduces the need for adaptation, lowering the optimal
adaptation levels.
The opposite effect is observed for the case of climate uncertainty (fig. 9b), where adaptation levels
are below the no uncertainty case before year 2090, and above beyond. This follows from similar lines
of reasoning regarding mitigation: here, adaptation is rather low until full mitigation (at 2090, for “CLI-
MATE”). After 2090, however, non-linearities in the climate system mean that, even with full mitigation,
increase in climate damage warrants increased adaptation.
In summary, mitigation and adaptation are affected differently by different sources of uncertainty, and
considering both together under uncertainty is important to understanding their optimal provision.31
Both mitigation and adaptation are strongly affected by uncertainty in two parameters identified as
key in the literature; climate sensitivity and damage exponent. Adaptation is significantly more sensitive
to damage uncertainty (and to a lesser extent to uncertainty in economic parameters) than mitigation.
Uncertainty over other parameters in isolation, including preference parameters, has no discernible effect
on either optimal adaptation or optimal mitigation policies.
4.4 Comparison with the Monte Carlo Approach
The Monte Carlo approach, the most commonly used approach when accounting for uncertainty in IAMs,
consists of running the deterministic model with many (here, a thousand) draws of all uncertain parameter.
Many previous Monte Carlo analyses (e.g. Nordhaus [2008]) have indicated that uncertainty over various
parameters, particularly in combination with the choice of normal distributions for uncertain parameters,
do not substantially affect climate change policies. We now compare how adaptation and mitigation under
uncertainty from our model (stochastic AD-DICE2016) differs from that using the Monte Carlo approach.
Figure 10a compares the optimal mitigation paths under both approaches. The results of the MC approach
are presented in the form of the average (over different paths) mitigation level, as is common. The median
and the range of Monte Carlo outcomes are also provided as well as the no uncertainty optimal mitigation
path. Furthermore the lowest (MC-lower) and highest levels found (MC-upper) in the Monte Carlo runs
are also graphed to indicate the range of results. Note that we use the same distributions for uncertain
31 Regarding the effect of uncertainty on adaptation costs and investments, we briefly mention key changes (details and figures
available upon request). In brief, allowing for mitigation significantly alters these: optimal adaptation costs are half as
large, damage-related uncertainty in particular affects adaptation. Overall, sensitivity in adaptation costs and investments to
uncertainty is muted when mitigation is allowed.
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parameters (and the same number–1000–of draws) for our approach and for the Monte Carlo approach,
to keep results comparable.
The key finding of 10a is that the choice of a method of dealing with uncertainty (MC versus our
method) matters for climate policy: introduction of uncertainty in parameters is seen to reduce optimal
mitigation when the Monte Carlo approach is used, contradicting the findings of the MC approach to
DICE in e.g. Nordhaus [2008], where little or no effect is found. The differences, we conjecture, are
due both to the choice of parameter distributions as well as the choice of the damage exponent (with
non-linear first order conditions) instead of the damage coefficient (with linear first order conditions) as
being uncertain. We find that when uncertainty results in a high variation of mitigation outcomes, using
the MC approach (and averaging across the resulting mitigation paths) leads to lower mitigation levels.
Moreover the mitigation path suggested by the Monte Carlo method and our model also differs: the path
suggested by our model is more or less parallel to that of the no uncertainty case while the Monte Carlo
optimal path has a very different curvature (and intersects the “No Uncertainty” mitigation curve very
early on, starting 2030). This illustrates a problem with Monte Carlo analysis, where the average (or any
summary measure) optimal control path is incoherent, from a decision making perspective.
Our findings related to optimal adaptation paths are similar: fig. 10b provides a comparison of opti-
mal adaptation paths (in the absence of mitigation) for our model (AD-DICE2016) and the Monte Carlo
approach. It is evident that the adaptation path using AD-DICE2016 is always higher than the no uncer-
tainty case. Using the Monte Carlo method, however, leads to a path lower than the no uncertainty case,









































All uncertain No uncertainty
(b) Adaptation.
Figure 10: Comparison of adaptation paths and mitigation paths under uncertainty with the
Monte Carlo method
Notes: ‘MC’ denotes Monte Carlo method (with 8 parameters uncertain), and “10–th”, “90–th” represent the
respective percentiles. “All uncertain”, “No uncertain” correspond to our model (AD-DICE 2016) with all (8)
parameters uncertain and no parameters uncertain respectively.
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Our results are consistent with those in the study of Crost and Traeger [2013], which provides a
comprehensive comparison of the Monte Carlo approach with the approximate DP approach, with only
the damage coefficient and damage exponent in turn uncertain. This study reports not only sizeable
quantitative differences but also the incoherence of the Monte Carlo approach. In terms of mitigation, it
finds that both their ex-post approach and the Monte Carlo (ex-ante) approach result in lower levels of
mitigation (when damage coefficient is uncertain). When examining mitigation expenditures, however,
this study finds that the Monte Carlo approach suggests increased mitigation expenditures, while their
ex-post approach suggests decreased expenditures. In summary, the mitigation paths suggested by the
Monte Carlo approach need bear no relation to any notion of optimality.
4.5 Climate change costs
Climate change costs are commonly summarised by the social cost of carbon (SCC), and recent discus-
sions related to the effect of policy change using IAMs has often focused on this important component
(see e.g. Pindyck [2017], Weyant [2017]). The SCC reflects the shadow price of carbon in terms of
climate change damages on different paths (of the control variable). While not the same as an (optimal)
carbon tax, it is nonetheless the most important metric of the size of the climate externality.32 The diver-
sity of ways of computing the SCC can make it difficult to compare these estimates across studies. To
obviate this issue, we use the approach to computing the SCC following that used in the DICE, which is
detailed next for convenience.
The SCC is an estimate of the economic value of the extra (or marginal) impact caused by the emission
of one more tonne of carbon at any point in time Yohe et al. [2007]. Following Nordhaus [2017], we







We note that the marginal impact of emissions at time t on utility is divided by the marginal utility value
of a unit of consumption in period t, which provides the monetary value of the impacts of an additional
unit of emissions. The SCC is estimated within the AD-DICE2016 model and represents a discrete
approximation of eq. (6). As in the DICE-2016R2, the SCC is expressed in terms of 2010 US $ (PPP) per
metric ton of CO2.
Recall that our model optimizes the controls over the many possible states of the world; as a result,
there is one estimate of the SCC for each possible state realised with uncertainty. Following other studies
with a similar characteristic (Crost and Traeger [2013], Traeger [2014], Nordhaus [2018,0]), the SCC (US
$ per ton of CO2) is presented as summaries over all possible states, in particular, the mean and the 10th
32 Indeed, the U.S. government constituted Inter-agency working group on the social cost of carbon has provided influential
estimates of the SCC, using the three major models, DICE, PAGE and MERGE; see Interagency Working Group on the
Social Cost of Carbon [2010], Greenstone et al. [2013], Johnson and Hope [2012] for details and the associated discussion.
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and 90th percentiles (the latter two may be thought of as providing a “confidence bound” on the mean)
along with those from the DICE-2016R2 using distributions suggested in Nordhaus [2018].
We provide a snapshot of the distribution of SCC over time in table 4 while table 5 details the effect
of different sources of uncertainty and of adaptation on the SCC. From table 4, it is clear that the SCC
increases steeply over time, possibly due to the non-linearity of climate-change-related damages. Fur-
thermore, as is evident from the 10th and 90th percentiles, the spread of the social costs of carbon is large
and increasing over time, where (in 2150) the 90th percentile is more than 20 times the 10th (from about
eight times in 2020). This may be related to the fact that many parameter combinations, e.g. states with
larger values of the damage exponent and climate sensitivity, will lead to large damages, leading to larger
social costs, in the future. This is also the finding of e.g. Ackerman et al. [2010], which finds a large
reduction in consumption resulting from large climate-change-related damages (for cases where climate
sensitivity parameter is larger than 3 and the damage exponent is larger than 4).
2020 2030 2040 2050 2080 2100 2150
AD-DICE2016
Full uncertainty
10th percentile 15 20 26 33 56 78 128
Mean 62 87 116 151 310 474 1174
90th percentile 136 189 259 336 677 1047 2842
No uncertainty
52 72 95 122 235 340 722
DICE 2016R2 No uncertainty 35 49 67 88 176 263 403
Mean (MC) 37 51 68 90 202 342 636
Table 4: Social costs of carbon in 2005 US$
Our estimate of the SCC without uncertainty for the base period (2020) is comparable to those of
many other modeling studies33: it is higher than the $42 implied in Nordhaus [2017], the $37 in Nordhaus
[2018] 34 the $16 in Gillingham et al. [2018] and the $20 in Traeger [2014] while lower than the $125
in Crost and Traeger [2013] (figure 4). Similarly, our estimate for the longer term future, at year 2100,
corresponds well with the figure in Nordhaus [2018], is similar to the range of values in Crost and Traeger
[2013] (450-550, in figure 4), while higher than the simpler calibrated model in Traeger [2014], at about
$200.
Examining table 4, it is clear that the effect of uncertainty on the SCC is sizeable, where the mean
value in 2020 is almost 20% higher than that without uncertainty. The difference between the two es-
timates (with and without uncertainty) slowly increases over time, and in 2150 the mean SCC with un-
certainty is larger than that without uncertainty by 60%. The difference in mean SCC with and without
uncertainty in our model is more than twice that in Nordhaus [2018], which is based on DICE-2016R2.35
33 It is worth noting that difference base years and discount rates make a strict comparison of the SCC across studies tricky. We
therefore limit ourselves to broad comparisons only, and provide computations of the SCC for DICE-2016.
34 This figure differs from that in AD-DICE2016 due to the climate sensitivity parameter being higher in AD-DICE2016.
35 Note that in Nordhaus [2018] the SCC is calculated based on an optimal mitigation path in the absence of uncertainty, whereas
our SCC estimated are based on an mitigation path optimised over uncertainty.
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In summary, our estimates of the mean SCC, while comparable to those in the current literature,
suggest that uncertainty does exert a significant effect on the SCC, and that an optimal carbon tax is likely
increasing significantly over time (which is also supported by the increasing variability of the SCC over
time). Further, our model suggests that, while following a similar path to that in DICE-2016R2 (starting
moderate and increasing rapidly), increases in the SCC are much stronger.
As to the effect of different sources of uncertainty, table 5 suggests that damage-related uncertainty
exerts a sizeable effect on the SCC, followed by climate uncertainty. These findings reinforce those
from previous sections, where mitigation response was seen to be significantly sensitive to these two
sources of uncertainty (see section 4.3). Other sources of uncertainty, together or in isolation, do not
exert as much of an effect (and are therefore not presented in the tables). Finally, our estimates for the
SCC when adaptation is excluded is almost twice as large as when it is included. This suggests that
adaptation is an exceedingly important channel for welfare improvements, and is again a reflection of our
findings previously, that mitigation was higher without adaptation than with. This also reflects the need
to incorporate adaptation into estimates of the SCC.
2020 2030 2040 2050 2080 2100 2150
Full Uncertainty
10th percentile 15 20 26 33 56 78 128
Mean 62 87 116 151 310 474 1174
90th percentile 136 189 259 336 677 1047 2842
Full Uncertainty–no adaptation
10th percentile 20 27 36 46 85 114 199
Mean 171 249 346 467 1004 1502 3309
90th percentile 396 579 801 1042 2288 3448 8314
Damage uncertainty only
10th percentile 23 30 39 49 91 133 284
Mean 61 86 116 150 296 429 872
90th percentile 116 166 225 296 590 854 1698
Climate uncertainty only
10th percentile 19 26 34 43 81 116 232
Mean 51 71 94 121 236 345 721
90th percentile 89 124 165 214 422 622 1308
Table 5: Social costs of carbon (2005 US$): Sources of Uncertainty
5 Conclusions
The main aim of this paper has been to overcome some of the challenges related to using IAMs for climate
policy analysis. To this end we develop a new IAM, AD-DICE2016 (based on DICE-2016R2), with which
we demonstrate that IAMs can not only be used to determining robust optimal policy paths under extreme
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(fat-tailed) uncertainty regarding model parameters but can also be simultaneously enriched to include an
hitherto neglected yet important aspect, adaptation, and without any restrictive model simplifications.
The literature concerning optimal climate policy with uncertainty has thus far been largely addressed
using either the Monte Carlo (MC) approach or the recursive Stochastic Dynamic Programming (SDP)-
based approach. In the MC approach, using a large number of draws from parameter distribution, the
optimal paths resulting from each draw is averaged to yield the average optimal path. This approach
has been shown (here and in previous studies) to lead to incoherent policy conclusions. The SDP ap-
proach, which provides a robust and well-developed approach to analysing policies under uncertainty, has
contributed significantly to understanding many dimensions of climate policy making under uncertainty.
This approach, however, often necessitates model dimension reduction, in view of inherent computational
challenges.
In this paper, we illustrate a method to account for parameter uncertainty using a state-contingent
approach, wherein parameters take outcomes in a large yet finite number of states-of-the-world, and the
decision maker optimizes over four control variables taking into account different outcomes in each state
of the world. In contrast to the SDP approach, we are able to increase the state space dimension (to seven,
from four in previous SDP versions of DICE) and the number of control variables (from two to four). Our
non-recursive yet coherent approach to uncertainty is suited to contexts where parameters are uncertain
(as in many IAMs), and, differs from MC approaches in that it considers every state-of-the-world when
determining optimal policy. Unlike the SDP-based approach, however, it is not suited for contexts where
the state variables evolve over time. Consequently, our approach to understanding the effect of parameter
uncertainty on climate policy in IAMs complements SDP-based approaches to analysing the effects of
structural uncertainty.
The AD-DICE2016 model includes several other important developments. Firstly, our model in-
corporates uncertainty over a large number of parameters (eight), each representing core aspects of the
climate-economy causal chain, in contrast to common practice in the literature that examines uncertainty
over very small number of parameters. Secondly, we incorporate more appropriate probability distribu-
tions based upon the most-recent knowledge, including “fat-tailed” distributions where recommended,
allowing for extreme damage possibilities (of up to 99.8% of GDP). Thirdly, we choose to use a bounded
burr utility function, following recommendations in both the theoretical and climate policy literature.
Finally, to enable climate policy setting that reflects real-world contexts, we include, in addition to miti-
gation, two types of adaptation policies, reactive and proactive adaptation. This aspect is rather important
in view of the differential time pattern of their costs and benefits, meaning that adaptation and mitigation
policies interact in non-trivial ways.
Our model yields three broad insights regarding climate policy: The first relates to the importance
of different sources of uncertainty: damage and climate uncertainty affect mitigation policies the most,
whereas adaptation policies are greatly influenced by uncertainty over damages. Our findings broadly
suggest that climate policy under uncertainty turns more aggressive i.e. mitigation is shifted forward
in time and adaptation investments and spending are increased. Secondly, we find that adaptation and
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mitigation policies under uncertainty exhibit strong inter-linkages, accentuating the need to consider both
policies simultaneously. Third, we find that the SCC rises steeply over time, consistent with the findings
of many recent deterministic studies. We also find that adaptation plays a significant role in the level of
SCC. Moreover, with uncertainty, we find that the SCC increases faster over time, more so than in most
studies in the extant literature. Such findings in the current IAM models have thus far been limited to
cases where “catastrophes” (e.g. Ackerman et al. [2010], Dietz [2011] ) were allowed for or controversial
choices of discount rates or other key parameters were made.
More broadly, our study is among the many recent ones e.g. Traeger [2014], Cai et al. [2012], Crost
and Traeger [2013], Ikefuji et al. [2020] which attempt to ameliorate many of the well known drawbacks
of IAMs, in particular dealing with uncertainty and climate policy, each in a different way. The over-
arching message of these disparate modeling efforts, we believe, is this: that while the current crop of
IAMs are unsatisfactory, suffering from an under-estimation of many risks (as pointed out in e.g. Stern
[2013], Pindyck [2013]) and from ad-hoc functional forms (as forcefully argued in Pindyck [2013]), there
are many alternative ways of improving these models. In particular, these modeling efforts illustrate a
scope for optimism, that IAMs can be improved as needed for policy analysis and that the drawbacks of
certain approaches to dealing with key aspects (such as the Monte Carlo approach to uncertainty, high-
lighted in Pindyck [2017], Crost and Traeger [2013]) of climate-economy frameworks need not mean that
these frameworks are entirely unsuited for policy evaluation. In any case, alternative frameworks that at-
tempt to quantify uncertain aspects of models, such as expert elicitation, suffer from their own drawbacks
(Oppenheimer et al. [2016]). Consequently, the use of IAMs to “organise our necessarily incomplete
perceptions” and “to make rough quantitative judgements about the consequences of economic policy..”
(in the words of Solow [1985]) may be both necessary and, as recent modeling advances (including ours
here) illustrates, perfectly feasible.
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Appendix A Static Welfare Framework
We introduce some notions of welfare, and its associated notation, that will help fix the precise idea
of preference aggregation necessitated when preference parameters vary. Denote by X the set of all
alternative states (called “social states” in the social choice literature), by N := {1,2, . . . , ,n} the number
of “individuals” in an economy, with each individual’s preferences represented by a utility function Ui
(clarified further below), defined on X . Uncertainty can be introduced by identifying X to be set of
all probability distributions L defined on a finite set of basic outcomes B := {b1, . . . ,bJ} i.e. with each
lottery x is associated a vector π = (π1, . . . ,πJ) of probabilities of obtaining outcomes b = (b1, . . . ,bJ);
Ui is interpreted as individual i′s VonNeuman-Morgenstern (vNM) Utility function.
Let W : X→R be a social welfare function (SWF) and let welfare be represented by an expected social
welfare function i.e. social preferences on X (alternatively, on lotteries L) can be represented by the ex-
pected value of a “vNM-Bergson”-type SWF, W . Then, Harsanyi’s Social Aggregation Theorem has the










ωiE [ui(b j)] , ωi > 0, (A.1)
which is of the weighted utilitarian form commonly used. Essentially, Harsanyi’s theorem provides a way
to aggregate preferences of individuals each of whom is an expected utility maximizer. In keeping with
the expected utility approach, society too is an expected utility maximizer and this results in the weighted
utilitarian manner of evaluating social prospects in (A.1).
Note that the typical preference aggregation is over individuals in a society who have different prefer-
ences, not over the same individuals with “uncertain” preferences. The interpretation of eq. (17) in Pizer
[1999] when aggregating over “preferences states of nature” is unclear, and there is no discussion of this
issue in that study. However, we argue that it is possible to reinterpret the setting as follows. Let there
be M “types” of individuals in every given population36; these individuals differ from one another in the
parameters of their utility function and their evaluation of inter-temporal trade-offs (i.e. pure rate of time
preference). In this case, aggregation over these M “individual types” have a straightforward interpre-
tation as a social aggregate over the different types of individuals, and one is back in the Harsanyi-like
setting above.
36 The individual types do not correspond to the population size, and are to be thought of as independent of it and invariant over
time, unlike population. Indeed, so far, our discussion has completely ignored the issue of population (implicitly assuming a
fixed population) while in our model, population is one of the uncertain parameters. We do not introduce population-ethics
based social choice since it is not clear that the added complication in our case can yield additional insights. See Dietz and
Asheim [2012] (and references therein) for a brief discussion of the issue of social welfare for varying populations in the
context of climate change.
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Appendix B Additional Figures





















(a) Effect of varying κ on utility function.


































(b) Effect of varying λ on RRA.





























Figure B.2: Comparing CRRA, Burr and Exponential utility functions (at low consumption
values).
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Appendix C Equations of AD-DICE-2016
Here we present the primary model equations for completeness. We note that certain equations used to
calculate parameter values over time have been omitted unless they directly concern the uncertain pa-
rameters. These parameters are identical to those in DICE-2016R2, and readers are directed to Nordhaus
[2017] and Nordhaus [2018] for a fuller description of these components of the model. Time is indexed
by t, the planning period by T = 1,2, ...,T , and the (uncertain) states of the world are indexed by s,
S = 1,2, ...,S. In what follows, parameters are written in lower case letters and variables in upper case
(except for Greek letters, where we do not make this distinction).
The model maximises utility subject to 7 state variable (K, SAD, MAT , MUP, MLO, TAT , TLO) and 4
control variables (MU , I, IAD, FAD). The following 10 parameters are drawn randomly from probability
distributions: κs , pops, ga1,s, gsig1,s, f oslims, φ12,s, α3,s, t2xco2s.
C.1 Utility





















with λs and κs the Burr utility-related parameters, Ct,s total consumption and Lt,s population. β t is the
discount factor computed as Rt = (1+ρt)−t
C.2 Output
Output before damages and abatement is determined by a Cobb-Douglas function of capital ( K ) and






Lt+1,s = Lt,s(pops/Lt,s)popad (C.4)
Total factor productivity is determined over time as a function of ga1,s :
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al(t,s) = al(1,s)/((1−ga(t,s))t (C.5)
gat,s = ga−dela∗t1,s (C.6)
Net output is given as the gross output minus net climate change damages (residual damages and adapta-
tion) and mitigation costs:
YNET,t,s = YGROSS,t,s(1−RDt,s−PCt −MCt). (C.7)
The consumption function is given by:
Ct,s = YNET,t,s− It . (C.8)
Capital accumulation is defined in the conventional manner:
Kt+1 = (1−δk)Kt + It , (C.9)
Where δk is the depreciation rate and It the investments in capital.
C.3 Emissions and mitigation
In the DICE-2016 and AD-DICE2016 models, mitigation–modelled as a fraction of total emissions–
represents a control or policy variable which reduces GHG emissions per unit of production. The rela-
tionship between economic prodcution and GHG emissions is described by the parameter σt , assumed
to exogenously decrease over time (reflecting the decarbonization of production via technological ad-
vances). Industrial emissions (EIND) are determined by the level of production, the value of σt and by
(the control variable of) mitigation (MUt) as
EIND,t,s = σt.sYGROSS,t,s(1−MUt), (C.10)
where σ ,µ ∈ [0,1] .









Naturally mitigation is carried out at a cost, determined as
MCt = θ1,t µ
θ2,t
t , (C.13)
where θ1,θ2 > 0. In the DICE-2016 and AD-DICE2016 models θ1 depends on the backstop technology
price and the level of carbon per unit of output, and is set at 0.2 initially (and decreases over time) while
θ2 is set at 2.8. The mitigation levels and costs represent an aggregate of possible mitigation options and
are updated in each version of DICE. Carbon sinks are included in the model after 2150 and are limited
to 20% of greenhouse gas emissions, hence in periods after 2150 emissions can be negative when full
mitigation is combined with carbon sinks.
Total emissions are given as the total of industrial emissions and emissions from land use
Et,s = EIND,t,s +ELU,t,s (C.14)
C.4 Damages and adaptation
Gross damages from climate change are given as a fraction of gross output as follows:
GDt,s = α1TAT,t,s +α2T
α3,s
AT,t,s, (C.15)
where α2 > 0 and α3 > 0. These are the damages that occur if no adaptation takes place, and are
thus higher than the net damages. These gross damages can be reduced through the use of adaptation
to residual damages. Residual damages depend on both the gross damages (GDt) and the total level of






Both forms of adaptation are imperfect substitutes for each other, and are aggregated using a Constant
Elasticity of Substitution (CES) function. Together with the residual damages function, this describes
how adaptation expenditures reduce the damages caused by climate change:





where SADt is the total amount of adaptation capital stock at time t and FADt is the amount spent on
reactive adaptation in period t. Furthermore, ρ = (σ−1)/σ is the elasticity of substitution between stock
and flow adaptation, with β ∈ [0,1], ρ ∈ (−∞,1] and γ1,γ2 > 0. Adaptation capital stock is accumulated
in the same manner as conventional capital stock:
SADt+1 = (1−δk)SADt + IADt , (C.18)
where δk is the depreciation rate and IADt are the investments in stock adaptation. The total adaptation
costs in each period are thus
PCt = FADt + IADt . (C.19)
C.5 Climate cycle
The CO2 stock in the atmosphere in each period is given as:
MAT,t+1,s = φ11,sMAT,t,s +φ21,sMUP,t,s +Et,s, (C.20)
The CO2 stock in the upper oceans is given as:
MUP,t+1,s = φ12,sMAT,t,s +φ22,sMUP,t,s +φ32,sMLO,t,s, (C.21)
The CO2 stock in the lower oceans is given as:
MLO,t+1,s = φ23,sMUP,t,s +φ33,sMLO,t,s, (C.22)
Radiative forcing is given as:
Ft,s = η{log[MAT,t,s/MAT,1750,s]/log2}+FEX ,t , (C.23)
Global mean atmospheric surface temperature:
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TAT,t+1,s = TAT,t,s +ξ1{Ft,s− ( f co22x/t2xco2s)TAT,t,s−ξ3[TAT,t,s−TLO,t,s]}, (C.24)
Temperature in the lower oceans is given as:
TLO,t+1,s = TLO,t,s +ξ4{TAT,t,s−TLO,t,s}, (C.25)
C.6 The Optimization Problem
The AD-DICE2016 model optimises by maximising utility (as definied in equation C.1) using the control
variables (MU , I, IAD, FAD) and subject to 7 state variable (K (see eq. C.9), SAD (see eq. C.18), MAT
(see eq. C.20), MUP (see eq. C.21), MLO (see eq. C.22), TAT (see eq. C.24), TLO (see eq. C.25)) :
max
It ,MUt ,IADt ,FADt
U
s.t. Kt+1 = f (Kt , It)
SADt+1 = (1−δk)SADt + IADt
MAT,t+1,s = f (MAT,t,s,MUP,t,s, It ,MUt ,θ)
MUP,t+1,s = φ12,sMAT,t,s +φ22,sMUP,t,s +φ32,sMLO,t,s
MLO,t+1,s = φ23,sMUP,t,s +φ33,sMLO,t,s
TAT,t+1,s = TAT,t,s +ξ1{Ft,s− ( f co22x/t2xco2s)TAT,t,s−ξ3[TAT,t,s−TLO,t,s]}
TLO,t+1,s = TLO,t,s +ξ4{TAT,t,s−TLO,t,s}
(C.26)
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